What is "truth"? Some philosophical contributions to psychiatric issues
Abstract
Philosophical perspectives, although eminently relevant to clinical investigation and practice, are rarely brought to bear on psychiatric topics. The author attempts to raise professional consciousness of core issues in the philosophy of science by examining the status of truth, theory, and observation in psychiatry. He evaluates prominent approaches to the problem of knowledge, particularly those of the "subjectivists" and "relativists," such as Schafer and Spence, and the "empiricists" and "inductivists," such as the proponents of DSM-III. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of science, the work of William James, and the classical Greek conviction that more truth resides in the middle than at either extreme, the author mediates between these rival points of view.
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