Discussion of these issues leaves the impression of three disparate approaches with their own preconceptions and goals. First is the unresolved philosophical debates about "free will" in terms of determinism or its lack. These use a framework of compatibilism or incompatibilism regarding determinism and freedom. Second, the neuroscientific approach uses increasingly sophisticated technology that raises questions about the functioning of the brain and its mysterious relationship to the mind. Third, the legal system assesses responsibility of people as intentional agents governed by reason. Morse does not see neuroscientific work as having many normative implications for law, as many believe. This is because he does not see responsibility having anything to do with "free will" but, rather, the capacity for rationality. He does not ignore the increase in biological knowledge, but he does not believe it negates a view of humans as causally efficacious. As he puts it, "If the realism constraint is true, all behavior is caused, but not all behavior is excused, because causation per se has nothing to do with responsibility. If causation negated responsibility, no one would be morally responsible, and holding people legally responsible would be extremely problematic" (p. 177). However, that is the problem, not a solution.