To the Editor: Eliminative materialism is a philosophical theory developed by Paul M. Churchland (1) that argues that neuroscience has restricted, and will eventually eliminate, any need for psychology. In his article, Dr. Kendler addressed whether it is appropriate for psychiatrists to accept the theory that "The sufficient cause for all material events is other material events" (p. 992). In opposition to eliminative materialism, Dr. Kendler presented conventional arguments that focus on ordinary (folk) psychology, which explains nonpathological human action by means of propositional attitudes, e.g., beliefs and desires. He also alluded to arguments against eliminative materialism, based on irreducibility of subjective states ("qualia"), multiple realizability of mental states, and human autonomy. These arguments, which presume normal action and absence of brain disease, have flaws that Churchland has addressed (2). The gist of Churchland’s response was that even if neuroscience cannot yet eliminate folk psychology or qualia, future advances will make this possible and desirable.