Although Strongman's interpretations of many important theorists and researchers are either wrong or simply inadequate, he offers enough of his own thinking to suggest that one of his errors provides an answer. In a tiny chapter devoted to what he calls "Ambitious Theories" (those which propose answers to his final question), Strongman identifies Tomkins only as the inspiration for Izard, whose "differential emotions theory" Strongman describes as "elegant" and "an enormous contribution" (p. 87), and to which he refers throughout the rest of his book. I can forgive Strongman for falling into the common misunderstanding of the link between their work: Izard's folksy paraphrase (1, 2) of Tomkins's densely written and demanding first two volumes of Affect Imagery Consciousness (3, 4), and his astonishing but unsubstantiated claim that differential emotions theory differs from Tomkins's affect theory, have until recently led most students of emotion to regard Izard as the father of modern emotion research rather than its witty and charming pretender. But I remain perplexed about Strongman's blindness to the simple truth that Tomkins was the first person in the history of the study of emotion to point out that emotion is not a vestigial remnant of a primitive system formed much earlier in our evolutionary heritage, significant mostly because it produces unwanted interference with neocortical cognition, but the conspicuous part of the system of the mind responsible for all urgency, importance, attention, and consciousness. Before Tomkins, affect equaled interference with cognitive life. After Tomkins, affect brought meaning to cognitive life. Strongman still hopes for a mostly cognitive explanation of emotion, one that has been made impossible by clinical experience with psychotropic drugs and the study of interaffectivity.